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Our Courts have, in many decisions stretching over decades, been 
faced with the problem of deciding whether the proceeds of the 
disposal of certain assets are revenue, or are of a capital nature. The 
assets which have given rise to the problem are those which one would 
normally consider to be capital in the hands of the taxpayer, but which 
may be held to have to have altered in character due to some action 
of the taxpayer, either by way of a change in the intention of the 
taxpayer regarding the asset in question, or by virtue of the method 
adopted by him in the disposal of the asset. The reported cases 
t dealing with this question arise mainly from the disposal of either 
shares or immovable property, although this has not always been the 
case. The principles involved in the inquiry remain the same, no 
matter what the nature of the asset is, but the application of those 
principles depends on a number of factors, including the nature of the 
asset, and of course, the circumstances of the taxpayer. 
Every taxpayer, whether he be an individual, or a Company, has 
circumstances which are peculiar to himself. In the same way every 
capital asset, whether it be held in the form of shares or in land has 
particular circumstances which will influence the method of 




whether the proceeds of disposal of a particular asset by a particular 
taxpayer, is or is not subject to income tax, has to consider the 
totality of all the circumstances involved. For this reason it may 
sometimes appear on a first reading that contradictory decisions have 
been arrived at, whereas in fact the decisions can be explained by 
differences, sometimes subtle, in the facts of the cases concerned. 
/ 
Accordingly, the tax advisor must be careful not to allow pre-
conceived ideas to cloud his judgement when considering a matter 
before him. It may well be that, hidden in the thicket of facts which 
seem to be common to all such matters, lies the single flower which 
will distinguish one matter from all others. 
Such a case was that of Mr Hans Middelman, whose share .dealing 
activities were recently considered by a Full Bench of the .1"1)e 
Provincial Division in the matter of Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
vs Middelman, a case which is, as yet, unreported. 
Mr Middelman was a director of companies who had acquired a 
portfolio of shares for investment purposes. He bought and sold 
shares with some regularity, and during the three year period under 
review by the Court he conducted 32 sales and incurred losses on only 
) 
4 occasions. The profits which he made on the sales of shares 
exceeded the dividend income from all shares owned by him. He 
acknowledged that he was an expert in share investments and 
maintained a policy of actively managing his portfolio. 
'--
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prospects; If these assumptions were not realised the share was sold 
and the proceeds used to purchase other shares. He had also sold 
shares in order to raise cash for other purposes. 
On these summarised facts, which will be dealt with later in greater 
detail, the Receiver of Revenue concluded that the taxpayer had 
embarked upon the trade of sharedealing, and sought to tax the 
I.· 
! ' 
: ; proceeds. On the face of it, and in the light of a number of decisions 
which will also be considered, it would seem that there was 
considerable justification for the attitude taken up by the 
Commissioner. However, Mr Middelman won his case in the Special 
Income Tax Court, and won again when taken on appeal to the Full 
Bench. 
Th e i m m e d i ate q u e st i o n t h at a r i s e s i s w h et h e r t h i s d e c i s i o n i n d i .c at e s 
that an individual, managing his capital in the manner referred to has 
greater scope to avoid the tax net than had been thought, or whether 
there were circumstances peculiar to Mr Middelman which would make 
his case unique. In order to consider this question, one has to return 
to first principles, gleamed from a long time of cases, and apply these 
to this case, and of course to every matter which the practioner may 
f be called upon to consider. At the same time, some of the broader 
f issues involved in matters of this nature will be examined. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INITIAL INQUIRY 
The Judicial Definitions of "Capital" and "Revenue" 
The fact that one is investigating a share dealing transaction makes 
no difference to the principles involved in deciding- whether the 
proceeds of a particular transaction are capital or revenl!e. The basic 
inquiry holds good for every type of transaction, and IT)USt begin with 
the definition of "Gross Income" in Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 
(1). This refers to "the total amount ... received by/or accrued to ... 
such person ... excluding receipts or accruals,.. ...... capital nature." 
The Income Tax Act makes no attempt to define the concept" ... of a 
capital nature ... " This task has been left to the courts to decide in 
each particular matter; the difficulties and limitations inherent in 
attempting such a definition, no doubt being the reason for the 
omission. 
The Courts have commented on what capital is and what income is but 
they have not attempted to give an all embracing definition of the 
phrase "of a capital nature" which could be used in all cases where the 
question to be determined is whether any particular receipt or accrual 
is, or is not, "of a capital nature". (Sub Nigel vs C.I.R.) (2). The 
impossibility of defining such a vague concept being self evident. 
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Nevertheless in dealing with the question whether in particular 
circumstances a receipt or accrual is, or is not, of a .capital nature, 
the Courts have over the years, decided in a long line of cases, what 
factors may be legitimately taken into account in determining the 
question. The principles thus established afford a measure of 
guidance where the question has to be determined in any particular 
case. (John Bell and Company (Pty) Limited vs S.I.R.) (3). However, as 
in all revenue cases the dictum of Steyn C.J. in C.I.R. vs African 
Oxygen Limited (4) must always be borne in mind:- "In so far as cases 
in our Courts decide what factors are to be taken into account in 
dealing with such a question, or cases in other Courts applying similar 
provisions draw attention to features which may on good grounds be 
accepted as relevant, they are of course of assistance, but each case 
must be decided on its own facts and circumstances."(Emphasis 
supplied). 
Before dealing with the manner in which the courts have endeavoured 
to distinguish between capital and revenue it will be instructive to see 
h ow t h e co u rt s re g a rd th o s e co n c e pt s . 
In Commissioner of Taxes vs Booysens Estate Limited (5) Innes C J 
said:- "Income considered in relation to capital is revenue derived 
from capital productivity employed. In a transaction of this nature 
where profit has·resulted from the disposal of the company's assets 
we have to enquire whether profit has resulted from the productive use 
of cap it a I e m p I o y e d t o e a rn it , o r w h et h e r it h as re s u It e d fro m t h e 
realisation of capital at an enhanced value". 
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In C.I.R. vs Visser (6) the Court said:- "If we take the economic 
meaning of 'capital' and 'income', the one excludes the other. 
'Income' .is what 'capital' produces, or is something in the nature of 
interest or fruit as opposed to principal or tree. This economic 
distinction is a useful guide in matters of income tax, but its 
application is very often a matter of great difficulty, for what is 
principal, or tree in the hands of one man, may be interest or fruit in 
the hands of another". 
In Overseas trust Corporation vs C.I.R. (7) Innes C J was again seized 
of the problem:- "Where an asset was realised at a profit as a mere 
change of investment there was no difference in character between 
the amount of the enhancement and the balance of the proceeds. But 
where the profit was a gain made by an operation of business in 
carrying out a scheme for profit making, then it was revenue derived 
from capital productively employed, and must be income". 
In similar fashion, Stratford CJ said in Lace P·roprietary Mines Limited 
vs C.J.R. (8):- "Is the accrual the result of the productive use of capital 
employed to earn profits? If so, it is income within the meaning of the 
Act for it is not an accrual of a capital nature". 
The Appellate Division made an attempt to give a definitive meaning to 
"fixed capital" in S.B.I. vs Aveling (9). The Court said that the essence 
of it was " ... 'n element van permanentheid in die sin dat daar 'n 
bedoeling is om die betrokke bate min of meer permanent te hou met 
die doel dat dit inkomste meet voortbring". Those words may well 
10, 
have been appropriate to the facts of that particular case, but they 
very obviously cannot form a general definition of a capital asset. Not 
all capital goods actually produce income for the taxpayer. His 
residence, for example is clearly a capital asset, as a' piece of vacant, 
unused land may be, although neither are income producing. In Bloch 
vs C.I.R. (10), Vos J realising the shortcomings of the definition in 
Aveling's case attempted to expand on it. He preferred, he said, to 
say that capital is that which is held with an element of permanency 
' 
and with the object that it should produce an economic utility for the 
holder. 
This statement of Vos J, is the closest that the Courts have come to 
the all-embracing "touchstone" referred to in the Sub-Nigel case, arid 
while not solving the problems inherent in the inquiry is a most useful 
guideline. 
Onus and Method of Approach 
The onus to prove that the receipts in question are of a _capital nature 
lies, in terms of Section 82 of the Income Tax Act, on the taxpayer, 
and is to be discharged, as in all civil matters, on a balance of 
probabilities. To discharge this onus the taxpayer has to show that 
the asset in question was, and remained, an item of ·fixed capital in his 
hands. How he goes about satisfying the Court in this regard can be 
gleaned from some of the judgements in which the subject has been 
considered. 
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Holmes J.A. laid down the method of approach in his introductory 
remarks in Natal Estates Limited vs S.I.R. (11). "In deciding whether a 
case is one of realising a capital asset or of carrying on a business, or 
embarking upon a scheme of selling land for profit, one must think 
ones way through all the particular facts of each case. Important 
considerations include, inter alia, the intention of the owner, both at 
the time of buying and of selling, the objects of the owner, if a 
company; his activities up to the time of selling, the light such 
activities throw on his ipse dixit, ... and the relationship of all this to 
the ordinary commercial concept of carrying on a business or 
embarking on a scheme for profit". 
Miller J adopted much the same approach in/. T.C. 1185 (12). "Perhaps 
t h e m o st i m p o rt a n t t e st i n c o n s i d e r i n g w h et h e r it i_ s t h e o n e o r t h e 
other of these (i.e. capital or revenue) is the intention with which or 
the object for which the' property is acquired. But it is clear that the 
application of that test will not in all cases produce the true answer to 
the fundamental question; a taxpayer might have bought property with 
the intention of holding it as a investment of capital for the purpose of 
earning income, but have changed his mind at a later stage and 
resolved to merge that asset with his ordinary stock in trade as it 
were". 
Wessels J.A. dealt with the matter in C.I.R. vs Stott (13) as follows:-
"For the purpose of ascertaining whether profits made upon the sale of 
an article are taxable, I think it accurate to say that it depends upon 
whether the article was acquired for the purpose of trade or not. It is 
/ 
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unnecessary to go so far as to say that the intention is conclusive as 
to whether the proceeds are taxable. It is sufficient to say that the 
intention is an important factor, and unless some other factor 
intervenes to show that when the article was sold it was sold in 
pursuance of a scheme of profit making, it is conclusive in determining 
whether it is capital or gross income". (Emphasis supplied). 
Clearly then, the starting point in the inquiry is to ascertain what the 
taxpayer's intention was when the asset was acquired. It then moves 
on to ascertain whether he may have had a second intention, whether 
his intention changed or can be deemed to have changed. Intention 
however is not the only criterion. There are other factors such as the 
scale of the taxpayers operation, the problems faced by Companies, 
and the commercial consequences of the taxpayers actions. One can 
do no better than adopt the sage advice of Holmes J.A. in the Natal 
Estates case (11} "to think ones way through all the facts of each 
case". 
The Difference between Land and Share Transactions 
The basic principles involved in attempting to differentiate between 
capital and revenue apply whatever the nature of the asset involved 
may be. In the application of those principles however, there are 
some differences between share dealing, and land transactions. The 
latter usually involves either township development, or the conversion 
of a property to Sectional Title and the sale of units. Generally share 
dealing cases involve the management and maintenance of a portfolio 
of shares. The essential difference between the two is usually that 
lJ =f . liiiis1iii■--™ "Iii' F* 4 . l■L .,■*iii-4 · 
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erven, or Sectional Title units are created from an asset which was 
acquired as capital, and then disposed of. In the case of shares, a 
portfolio is built up and then individual shares within that portfolio are 
bought and sold in the course of managing the portfolio. Of course, 
were a taxpayer to purchase and sell erven, that would be similar to 
share dealing. 
In the case of land transactions involving development and sale, it is 
trite law that a taxpayer is entitled to dispose of his capital asset to 
best advantage, and the mere fact that he does so in stages, or in a 
manner which involves him in development, does not, by itself, alter 
the capital nature of the asset. 
In share dealing cases, the portfolio as a whole may well be retained 
with the object of long term capital investment, while individual 
components are bought and sold. The question whether the taxpayer 
has gone over to trading in either case depends largely on scale. In 
the case of shares, this is complicated by the fact that prevailing 
economic conditions may have a marked effect. If the stock market is 
dropping, an investor may well be justified in selling shares to 
preserve the value of his portfolio. If the market is rising, then it may 
well be held that profits on sales were forseeable and that the ·taxpayer 
had therefor embarked on a scheme for profit making. 
Some of these problems will be considered again, but it is necessary 
to bear them in mind when applying cases involving one type of 
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THE CONCEPT OF INTENTION 
What is meant, in the legal sense, by the concept of intention? This 
was considered by Lord Hai Isham in Director of Public Prosecutions vs 
Hyam (1). He said that purpose, (or motive) is what is in a persons 
mind when he performs an act. "Intention", which has a wider meaning 
en:ibraces, in addition to the objective, all necessary consequences of 
an actioo_, including the means to the end, and any consequences 
intended along with the end. "Intention", the learned Judge went on to 
say, includes "sub-conscious motives". It follows therefor that 
intention is to be sought in a much wider field than the taxpayers ipse 
dixit; the logical consequences of his actions must be investigated. 
The question of how the taxpayers intention is to be ascertained will 
be dealt with in greater detail when examining the ipse dixit, but for 
the present only the consequences of intention, once ascertained, will 
be looked at. 
The Original Intention 
The importance of ascertaining the taxpayers intention when acquiring 
the asset in question has been referred to in a quotation from Wessels 
J A in Stotts case (2). If the taxpayer's intention was to acquire the 
asset to hold as an investment, or to paraphrase the words of Vos J in 
Bloch's case, (3) to hold the asset with an element of permanancy with 
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the object of obtaining an economic benefit from it, then that asset 
becomes capital in the hands of the investor. It remains capital unless 
and until some other factor intervenes to change the character of the 
asset. 
In examining the taxpayers original intention it has been held that it is 
not necessary that he should have excluded from his mind the 
slightest contemplation of a profitable resale of the asset, in order to 
establish a cap ital intention. (C of T vs Levy) (4). Th is wou Id indeed 
be an unnatural standard to apply. 
Of course, if the taxpayer uses the asset in a scheme of profit making, 
then the intention and means of acquisition will not be relevant. In 
C.l.R. vs Strathmore Exploration Limited (5) the Company acquired 
property by inheritance. Its objects empowered it to do "landjobbing", 
and that is what it set about. The profits were held to be taxable. 
Having ascertained the taxpayers intention in acquiring the asset, one 
must then consider whether he may not have had, or be deemed to 
have had, a second objective in mind. The taxpayer may well have 
purchased shares with the intention of holding for dividends, but may 
also have had in mind the idea of selling at a profit if the right 
circumstances arose. If neither objective is dominant then the 
problem which the taxpayer faces in Court is that he is unable to 
discharge the onus imposed on him under Section 82 of the Income 
Tax Act. He will be involved in the single business of turning his asset 
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North Traders vs C.I.R.) (6). 
If it can be held that a taxpayer had a dual intention in his dealings 
then, in the first instance the Court must seek out a dominant 
intention, and if one exists, apply it to the case. In C.O.T. vs Levy (4) 
the following statement was made· " ... where the purposes of an 
individual taxpayer are mixed, the only course on principle as well as 
for practical reasons, is to seek and give effect to the dominant factor 
operating to induce him to effect the purchase. It seems to me that 
the only test to apply is that of the main or dominant purpose". (7) 
In S.I.R. vs African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Limited (8) Steyn 
CJ assumed that the criterion was also applicable to a company. (9) 
His comments on the principle involved will be referred to again. (10) 
In applying this to the facts of the case, the Chief Justice said:-
"Where for instance a company, whose main concern as an investor is 
an income from dividends, confines its purchases to sound equities 
with the highest dividend yield, but, at the same time intends, in order 
to increase its income, to sell whenever it is able to do so at a 
substantial profit, that intention, although so closely connected with 
its main object that it may be said to be inseparable from it, would not 
o rd i n a r i I y r a n k as m e re I y i n c i d e n t a I to s u c h a d o m. i n a n t p u r p o s e ... 
whatever the primary objects of a company might be, it is quite 
possible that it may derive income in the ordinary course of b~siness 
from carrying out its secondary objects".(11) 
:eA A~ -#AW #9 111!1' "B" I ::::,.. A l»i f,M . ¥ 4 .-, 41 · if¥ . 
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In this case it was held that the taxpayer knew in advance that 
variations in investments would be profitable, and also that variations 
were an integral part of the management of its portfolio. It thus had 
in mind a definite purpose, distinguishable from, but not unconnected 
with its purpose of acquiring dividends. Under those circumstances, 
the regular dealing in shares could not be held to be a merely 
incidental activity. 
The principle was applied in the Barnato Holdings Limited vs S.I.R (12) 
in a somewhat different manner. Here it was held that the taxpayer 
acquired shares with the intention, inter alia, that, should their market 
price increase without a corresponding increase in yield it was a 
business policy to sell them, generally at a profit. This amounted to 
a clear, secondary intention. 
The same principle was considered in C.I.R. vs Tod (13) in relation to 
what was described in the judgement as phase three of Tods 
operation. He bought and sold shares with some regularity in order to 
acquire the dividends on the shares. Although it was accepted that 
the main purpose was the acquisition of dividends, the fact that it was 
contemplated and even planned that frequent purchases and sales 
would be carried out, and that sales would not be made at a loss, 
amounted to a secondary intention to earn profits. The profit that 
resulted from these frequent sales therefor "was no fortuitous 
enhancement. It followed from facts which were withi.n the 
contemplating of the contracting parties and the resulting benefits 
must have been w'i thin their intention. The profits of such a 
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transaction are not of the nature of capital". 
Corporation vs C.I.R. (14)). 
(Overseas Trust 
The line between the secondary intention which becomes a business, 
and the management of a portfolio must necessarily be a fine o,ne. It 
must be an integral part of the proper management of a portfolio of 
shares which are held "for keeps" that from time to time particular 
shares within that portfolio will deteriorate in value, and it cannot be 
expected of a prudent investor that he must refrain from intervening 
for fear of being taxed on any profits made while switching from 
shares whose value is declining to better shares. The problem that 
this gives rise to is where the line should be drawn. The African Life 
case and that of Barnato Holdings, and Tod rPforred to above, show 
clearly that while income may be the main object of the investor, this 
can well be present at the same time as a decision that the taxpayer 
is trading in shares. 
However, if one of the taxpayers intentions is dominant then that 
dominant purpos'.e prevails. Support for this principle is to be found 
in Levys case (4) and S.I.R. vs African Life Investment Corporation 
(8). 
i The meaning of "dominant intention" was considered in C of T vs Glass 
(15), decided in the Federal Court of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The 
relevant paragraph from the judgement reads as follows:- "A dominant 
purpose exists where the alternative objective, through perhaps in 
contemplation, and even a material factor in the general decision to 
21 
buy, was entirely secondary and did not operate to a substantial 
extent on the taxpayers mind. If his real motives were so mixed that 
he may be fairly said to have been substantially and almost equally 
moved by both, the fact that he preferred one potential result to the 
other, would not amount to a dominant purpose". 
The question was also dealt with, albeit from a different point of view 
in African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Limited vs S.I.R. (8). In this 
case Steyn CJ considered what a dominant purpose was. "Whether or 
not a purpose is dominant in the sense that another co-existing 
purpose may be effected at a profit without attracting liability for tax 
is a matter of degree, depending on the circumstances. A purpose 
may be a main purpose without being dominant. .. there would I 
consider be such a main purpose, where ti.ere is a further purpose, 
simultaneously pursued by way of an additional, albeit subsidiary, 
activity calculated to yield a profit" (16). In other words a main 
purpose under such circumstances would not absolve the profits of the 
secondary activity from tax. 
In C.I.R. vs Paul (17) the taxpayer wished to purchase 30 to 40 acres of 
a certain piece of land. The owner however, was only willing to sell a 
much larger portion, which the taxpayer purchased. Later he sold off. 
the surplus at a profit, retaining the ground he originally wanted. The 
Commissioner alleged that he had made a business of selling off the 
surplus, but the Court held that his dominant purpose was the 
acquisition of that portion of the land he wanted and that he was 
merely engaged in disposing of a capital asset to best advantage. 
H 
' '7' 





A Change of Intention 
The inquiry must then proceed to investigate whether the taxpayer, 
either while holding the asset, or in deciding to dispose of it, may 
have changed the intention he had on acquisition. There are two 
aspects to this part of the inquiry. The taxpayer may have subjectively 
and deliberately changed his intention. More likely, and more difficult 
to ascertain, the change of intention may be deemed to have taken 
place from the circumstances surrounding the decision to dispose of 
the asset, or the circumstances under which the asset was disposed 
of. 
Here again, a change of intention does not necessarily render the 
proceeds -of a sale taxable. In a minority judgement in C.I.R. vs 
Richmond Estates (Pty) Limited (18), Schreiner J A discussed this 
problem. He stated that while the cases have held that a change of 
intention may effect the results they have not found that a change of 
policy or intention by itself, necessarily effects a change in the 
character of the assets in question. 
In the Natal Estates case (19) the company embarked upon township 
development of land which, until then, was clearly a capital asset. The 
development took place on a large scale, and Holmes J.A. said " ... with 
its elaborate and sustained scheme and expertise· (the Appellant) was 
doing much more than merely realising a capital asset to the best 
advantage in a businesslike manner; by any canons of commerce it 
had gone beyond that field; it had crossed the Rubicon and committed 
• j,'--
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itself on a grand scale to the course and business of selling land for 
profit, using its land as its stock-in-trade" (20). 
Natal Estates Limited were taxed on the profits of their disposal on 
account of the scale of the operation upon which they embarked, this 
scale amounting to a change of intention. The question of scale will 
be referred to again. 
In Barnato Holdings Limited vs S.I.R (12) the taxpayer lost as it was 
held that it had embarked upon a secondary business. This case will 
be considered in some detail later. This is a similar principle to that 
referred to above in the Natal Estates case (19). The court in Barnato 
Holdings Limited accepted that the taxpayers primary business (i.e. 
intention) was and remained the holding of long term investments. 
However, it was held that it had become an integral, albeit secondary 
part of their business to deal in shares. Accordingly while each 
transaction which the Company had entered into considered in 
isolation, might per se be regarded as merely a change in the holding 
of an investment, when the totality of all the numerous transactions 
(the circumstances, nature, extent and frequency) was regarded they 
must be accepted as falling within a secondary business. The Court 
went on to find that in acquiring the shares Barnato Holdings Limited 
had the intention, inter alia, that, should the price rise without a 
corresponding increase in yield, it was a business policy to sell them . 




Some Other Considerations 
In the Natal Estates Limited case (19) the Appellate Division 
considered the scale upon which the development and disposal of the 
land was conducted. Natal Estates Limited had owned most of the 
property involved for decades and had farmed on it. There is no doubt 
that it was a capital asset in the hands of the Company prior to the 
decision to sell. This decision had been forced on the Company. The 
land in question was required by the City of Durban for urban 
development and the Company had been advised that if it did not itself 
develop the land this would be expropriated. It was argued on behalf 
of the Company that under those circumstances what it was doing was 
disposing of its capital asset to best advantage and that the character 
of the enhancement was not changed by the disposal. The Company 
denied that there had been any change of intention which would have 
the effect of altering the nature of the land from capital to stock. The 
finding of the Court was that by virtue of the scale on which the 
development was carried out the taxpayer had made a business of its 
disposal. In effect, the grand scale of the operation amounted to a 
deemed change of intention. 
One of the fundamental pillars of this judgement was that, by virtue 
of the grand scale of the disposal operation the taxpayer had " 
crossed the Rubicon" and had to be deemed to have embarked upon 
an operati9n of business in carrying out a scheme for profit making. 
The Court spoke of" the test of degree ... " and went on" ... where the 
owner sub-divides the land, the planning, extent, duration, nature, 
t .\¥9 -
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degree, organisation and marketing operation of the enterprise and the 
relation of all this to the commercial concept of carrying on a 
business ... from the totality of the facts, one enquires whether it can 
be said that the owner has crossed the Rubicon and gone over to 
business"(21). Although the scale of operations was not the prime 
reason for the finding in either Barnato Holdings Limited (12) nor in 
African Life Investment Corporation Limited (8), nevertheless the scale 
was investigated and commented on in both cases, and became a 
relevant part of the inquiry into the principles which decided them. it 
is difficult to believe that, had Barnato Holdings Limited only been 
involved in, say, a quarter of the number of transactions mentioned in 
the judgement, the Court would have come to the same conclusion. 
The facts in Income Tax case No. 1354 (22) were somewhat similar to 
those in Barnato Holdings Limited, but here the transactions were in 
fact conducted on a lesser scale. This was commented on by the 
Court and the case was decided, inter alia, on the grounds that the 
scale of operation did not approach that of Barnato Holdings Limited. 
The test of scale can be traced back to the principle first set out by 
Lord Justice Clerk in California Copper Syndicate vs Harris (1.R.) (23) 
as follows:- " ... the question to be determined being - Is the sum of 
gain that has been made a mere enhancement of value by realising a 
security, or is it a gain made in an operation of business in carrying 
out a scheme for profit-making"? 
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In Overseas Trust Corporation Limited vs C. I. R. (14) Innes C J adopted 
that phrase and went on to expand its scope - "This (the profit in the 
case) was no fortuitous and unforeseen.enhancement. It followed from 
facts which were within the knowledge of the contracting parties, and 
the resulting benefits must have been within their contemplation and 
intention. The profits of such a transaction are not of the nature of 
capital" (23). 
The words "scheme for profit making" and "foreseen enhancement" 
really mean that the profits in question are designedly sought and 
worked for {24). 
In the Overseas Trust case (14) the taxpayer did not sell an asset at a 
profit. It acquired shares in the knowledge that the holder of such 
shares would become entitled to an ascertainable sum of money in due 
course, which was in excess of the purchase price of the shares. The 
ratio of the decision was the foreseeability of the resultant· 
enhancement. 
In seeking to ascertain the taxpayers intention towards his asset as 
part of the inquiry as to whether the asset is capital, the Courts have, 
in two cases, dealt with what we may term the "for keeps" principle. 
In the Barnato Holdings Limited case {12), the Company conceded that 
shares were subject to fluctuations in value, and that accordingly it 
was necessary from time to time to switch out of some shares and into 
others, and this was always contemplated as part of its business. 
Trollip J.A. in dealing with this aspect, wrote:- "This would tend to 
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indicate prima facie that those shares were not acquired for better or 
worse, or relatively speaking, for "keeps", (i.e. only to be disposed of 
if some unusual, unexpected or special circumstance warranting or 
inducing disposal, supervened), which is the usual badge of a fixed, 
capital investment" (24). 
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue vs Tod ( 1 3), the Court Io o ked at the 
circumstances in which the taxpayer acquired his portfolio of shares 
and how he had rationalised it by selling certain shares and buying 
others. Having done so, Milne JP concluded:- "I think it is fair to sum 
up the evidence thus far by saying that there is no reason whatsoever 
to doubt that, although the taxpayer spread the risk in his portfolio by 
shedding some shares, reducing his holding in others, and acquiring 
still others, one is looking at a portfolio of shares that was held for 
long term investment purposes" (25). The Judge then quoted with 
approval the extract from the judgement of Trollip J A set out above, 
and applied it to Tads case. 
In Barnato Holdings Limited (12) the Court applied the "for keeps" 
principle to the individual shares in the portfolio, while in Tads case 
(13) the Court applied it to the portfolio as a whole. This apparant 
discrepancy can be explained firstly by the vastly greater scale on 
which Barnato Holdings operated, and secondly, by the fact that the 
Court found that Barnato Holdings had embarked on a secondary 
business of sharedealing. Tod fell into neither of these categories. 
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THE TAXPAYERS IPSE DIXIT 
Counsel for Middelman (1) submitted that, while the taxpayers ipse 
dixit is not necessarily conclusive, when the Court has no reason to 
disbelieve his evidence, and it is not contradicted by the objective 
facts, then the taxpayer will have discharged the onus upon him. The 
Court held that there could be no quarrel with that statement. "The 
Taxpayer" (2) writes that this is an important finding which can be 
relied upon by others in appropriate circumstances. 
In an earlier edition of "The Taxpayer" (3) the task of the Court in 
ascertaining intention is aptly summed up. "Tax Law has attempted 
to ascertain the taxpayers intention ... by considering not only his 
ipse dixit but a range of factual criteria such as the conduct of the 
taxpayer in relation to the transactions in issue, the frequency of 
involvement in transactions of a similar kind, the nature of his 
business organisation etc. From these objective facts, our Courts 
have sought to imply an intention to the taxpayer". 
If consideration and weight is given to the meaning of "intention" as 
set out by Lord Hails ham in Hyams case (4), then clearly the taxpayers 
ipse dixit cannot be considered in isolation. 
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In I.T.C. 1185, (5), Miller J, when dealing with the ipse dixit on 
i n t e n t i o n s a i d " I t i s t h e f u n ct i o n of t h. e C o u rt to d et e r m i n e on a n 
objective review of all the relevant facts and circumstances, what the 
motive, purpose and intention of the taxpayer were. Not the least 
important of the facts will be the course of conduct of the taxpayer in 
relation to the transactions in issue, the nature of his business or 
occupation and the frequency or otherwise of his past involvement or 
participation in similar transactions. The facts in regard to those 
matters will form an important part of the material from which the 
Court will draw its own inferences against the background of the 
general human .and business probabilities. This is not to say that the 
Court will give little or no weight to what the taxpayer says his 
intention was .... The taxpayer's evidence under c~+i, ... must 
necessarily be given full consideration, but direct evidence must be 
weighed and tested against the probabilities and the inferences 
normally to be drawn from the established facts". 
This passage was adopted in the C.P.D. by Grosskopf J, in Malan vs 
K.B.I. (6). He went on to say, "Die rede waarom 'n belastingpligtige se 
ipse dixit nie noordwendig aanvaar word nie, hoef nie te beteken dat 
sy eerlikheid in twyfel getrek word nie. Mense se bedoelings is 
dikwels wisselend, ongevorm en ongeformuleer, en hul ex post facto 
getuienis daaroor, hoewel eerlik, is dikwels onbetroubaar, of bestaan 
uit blote rekonstruksie". 
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When the same case went to the Appeal Court (7) Rabie C J, 
considered that Grosskopf J had gone too far. He said that, because 
of the onus which is imposed on the taxpayer by Section 82 of the 
Income Tax Act, his evidence and credibility must be very carefully 
considered. He went on, "'n bevinding van geloofwaardigheid kan, 
afhangende van die feite van die saak, 'n faktor van deurslaggewende 
belang wees." 
The statement of Berman J, in Middelman (1) referred to in the first 
paragraph of this chapter is in line with, and supported by that of 
Rabie CJ. The problem, however, lies in the qualification which each 
attaches to his judgement. A finding of credibility in favour of the 
taxpayer is decisive in discharging the onus, provided that his 
evidence is not contradicted by the objective facts {per Berman J) or 
"afhangende van die feite van die saak". (Per Rabie C J) These 
qualifications leave the test to the discretion and opinion of the Judge 
in each case. He still has to consider the objective facts, and it is 
submitted that the test formulated by Miller J, is still applicable. 
Otherwise the statement of Berman J makes little sense. He said " ... 
when the Court has no reason to disbelieve his evidence, AND it is not 
contradicted by the objective facts" (Emphasis supplied). Unless the 
objective facts are regarded in the manner suggested by Miller J then 
it would be a contradiction to give credibility to the taxpayer and yet 
find that his ipse dixit was drawn into question by other facts. 
' 'ilii,£$!l.,.&9-A/4Mi,i,,"'rm'T~ 
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There appears thus to be little doubt that the ipse dixit cannot be, and 
is not, considered in isolation. A finding of credibility in favour of the 
taxpayer is not enough. It is but one factor, albeit an important 
factor, in a range of issues which must be considered by the Court, 
particularly in ascertaining intention. One is once again reminded of 
the words of Holmes J.A (8) that the tax advisor is required to "think 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS 
That the Courts do look with different eyes at Companies and 
Individuals has been clear both in South Africa and in Britain for a 
very long time. The question first arose in the English case of Smith 
vs Anderson (1). The Master of the Rolls said in that case that acts 
done by a company may be regarded as business, while those same 
acts, if done by an individual would not. He went on"- "A man 
occasionally buys and sells land, as many landowners do, and nobody 
would say that he was a landjobber or dealer in land, but if a man 
made it his particular business to buy and sell land to obtain profit, he 
would be designated as a dealer in land". 
The principle has been explained and expanded upon in a number of 
English decisions. It was considered in some detail in Inland Revenue 
vs Kore an Syndicate Limited ( 2) . T h e p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h t h e C o mp an Y · · , 
was formed, was described in its Memorandum, inter alia, as that_o_f 
acquiring mining concessions and turning them to account for the _ 
purpose of making a profit. It obtained such a concession in Korea; 
which it originally proposed to work with its own capital. How~v_e_r,Jt 
then entered into an agreement to hand over its rights to another 
company and receive an annual payment. The nature of this contract 














¾. argument the Court said "The fact that a limited company and an 
individual come into existence in a different way is a matter to be 
considered. An individual comes into existence for many purposes, or 
perhaps for none, whereas a limited company comes into existence for 
some particular purpose". If the company carries out that purpose 
then it is trading, the Court held. 
The question came before the same Court in Inland Revenue 
Commissioners vs Westleigh Estates Company Limited (3):-"lt was 
contended that the Company was merely in the position of an ordinary 
landowner dealing with his land, but assuming that in the case of an 
individual to do such things would not be to carry on a trade or 
business, it does not at all follow that the conclusion would be the 
same i n the case of a Com pan y, the end and object of whose being is 
to transact the business in question, and thereby make a profit. The 
numbers of its transactions are irrelevant if it is formed to carry on a 
business and it is in fact carrying it on". 
The reason for the different approach was explained in Commission:e(: 
of Taxes vs British Australian Wool Realisation Association Limited (4) .~s .. 
follows:- "The distinction arises from the fact that whereas the 
capacities of a natural person have no limitation, so that any partic_ular 
transaction need not be referred to any of them, a company is :80 
bounded by its Memorandum, that it may be both permissible 8" d 
essential to consider its authorised objects in connection wi th th8 
actual transaction in question, and even to seek for the pdncipal 





purpose of its formation". 
In C.I.R. vs Stott (5) Wessels J A said "If you are dealing with a 
company, one of whose objects is to buy and sell land, then the 
company might well be considered to be doing the business of selling 
and buying land even though it carries out a single transaction". 
Accordingly the objects of a company become an important part of 
the inquiry. The objects were scrutinised in both the Barnato Holdings 
Limited (6) and African Life (7) cases. On the other hand, Trollop J.A. 
refused to give too much importance to the objects clauses in Malone 
Trust vs S.I.R. (8). "It is judicially recognised that objects are often 
stated in very wide terms in a companies memorandum, merely in case 
some need to have the corresponding powers may arise at some time 
in the future. Of greater importance than the cold print of the objects 
clause are the actualities of the situation". This must be read with a 
statement of Stratford J A in C.I.R. vs Lydenberg Platinum Limited (9) 
"The test to be applied in the case of an individual is not quite the 
same as the test in the case of trading company. In the case of a 
company we have primarily to look at its objects laid down in its 
constitution and next at its actual operations". 
Both judges were dealing with pre-1973 companies. Very few 
companies today have the all-embracing objects clauses of those 
companies, but nevertheless the main object and any ancillary objects 
may well have a bearing on the matter. The deeming provision in 
Section 33(3) of the Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 may also have to 
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be taken into account. 
A company is generally formed for a business purpose and it is 
reasonable to expect a Court to regard its dealings from that point of 
view. On the other hand if an individual invests his surplus funds in 
as s et s s u c h as s h a re s i t i s u s u a 11 y c I e a r th at h i s o r i g i n a I i n t e,n ti o n i s 
to invest and to hold his investment. The individual would then have 
to be seen to be ch an g i n g over to a position of tr ad i n g by vi rt u e of th e 
nature or scale of his operations. It is submitted that the finding in 
Barnato Holdings Limited (6) that the company had engaged in a 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE MIDDELMAN JUDGEMENT 
In order that we may consider the Middelman judgement (1) in its 
proper context it is necessary first to deal with the facts. 
Unfortunately they were not set out in detail, or in logcal order in the 
Courts judgement and some reconstruction has been necessary. 
Mr Middelman was a director of Companies who had acquired a 
portfolio of shares for investment purposes. He was an acknowledged 
expert in share investments, and was a director of at least one public 
company. He bought and sold shares in the course of managing his 
portfolio. Unfortunately the judgement does not tell us what the size 
or value of the portfolio was, but the scale of operations was referred 
to. During the three year period under review by the Court, Mr 
Middelman conducted 32 sales, and incurred losses on only 4 
occasions. The profits made on the sales were in excess of the 
dividend received on all shares in the portfolio. As dealings during 
the period in question took place in a rising market, profits were 
almost inevitable. There can be no question that he was unaware of 
this fact, and it must have been within his contemplation while he was 
conducting his operation. 
P; , 
43 
Mr Middelman's testimony was accepted by the Court without 
hesitation or qualification. He stated that all purchases 6f shares were 
done to maximise long term investment income, and that profit was 
purely incidental to that aim. He was adamant that he had never 
bought shares because there was a profit to be made out of their re-
sale, nor had he ever sold a share in order to take a profit. 
In July 1984 the taxpayer wrote a letter to the Receiver of Revenue 
setting out what his motivations were when buying shares, and he 
expanded on this in a subsequent letter a year later. Amongst other 
things he said that before deciding to purchase a share he made 
certain assumptions concerning the companies future prospects. If his 
assumptions were not fulfilled, he then sold the share, regardless of 
the price, and used the proceeds to purchase other shares. We are 
not told what the assumptions were, but can assume that these were 
to the effect that he would continue to receive an adequate return on 
his investment. 
It is implicit in the wording of the letters to the Receiver and in his 
evidence that Mr Middelman at all times had in mind the possibility 
that it would be necessary from time to time to sell shares in the 
portfolio and replace them with shares whose prospects were better. 
He certainly regarded the portfolio itself as being held "for keeps" for 
long term investment. 
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It is true that on occasion he sold shares with a different motive. For 
instance he sold shares on one occasion in order to raise cash to 
build a new home. The number of these transactions was not given, 
but as the Court found that all these " exceptional sales" were 
adequately explained, and did not amount to a departure from his 
expressed policy, they need not concern us further. 
It is submitted that these facts confirm that in acquiring shares and 
in building up his portfolio Mr Middelman had a capital intention. The 
questions that arise therefore are whether this intention was a 
dominant, or merely a main intention, and whether the scale of the 
transactions in which he became involved were such that it could be 
held that he had crossed the Rubicon and gone over to trading. 
In seeking the answer to whether the capital intention was a dominant 
one regard must be had to the words of the Chief Justice in the African 
Life Investment Corporation case (2). He said that the answer was a 
matter of degree depending upon the facts. In reaching an answer the 
Court would have to consider the size of the portfolio, that is the 
number and value of counters, and balance this against the number of 
transactions. Also relevant would be the total profit earned from the 
sale of shares in the period under review. 
Unfortunately, the judgement in Middelman's case does not give 
sufficient detail to enable us to arrive at any conclusions, and so, 
unfortunately the issue must remain unresolved. One can only 
comment that this aspect, together with others still to be mentioned, 
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was a matter pertinent to the inquiry before the Court, and if 
considered in depth could have assisted the Court in resolving the 
matter. 
However, that is not an end to the inquiry. The objective fact remains 
that the taxpayer had in mind at all times certain factors which also 
appear to have been glossed over by the Full Bench. These are that 
criteria were applied to all shares in the portfolio, and that if the 
shares did not meet the standards set in advance those shares would 
be sold. This inevitably involved a regular review of the shares held 
as well as a full study of other shares for potential purchase. The 
taxpayer was a director of public companies, and a man of admitted 
expertise in the field in which he operated. To that extent therefor it 
was not necessary for him to employ advisors as was done in the 
Barnato Holdings case (3). He dealt over a considerable period in a 
rising market in which profits were inevitable. The taxpayer must be 
held to have had a policy to sell shares which failed to maintain the 
standards which he set for them prior to purchase. 
The other side of that coin must surely be that it can never be 
expected of an investor in shares that. he cannot ever review his 
ownership of a particular share without the shadow of the Receiver of 
Revenue looming over him. It is inherent in such investment that each 
share must be reviewed from time to time, and that, in the nature of 
things, certain shares will deteriorate in value and the prudent investor 
will replace them with shares of a better quality. It cannot be 
expected that an investor must stand idly by and watch his capital 
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assets being eroded through factors well beyond his influence. 
Whether he incurs losses or makes profits on such switching is largely 
a matter of luck and of history. It is not unlikely that the economy 
may enter a long downward phase in which overall losses may be 
expected. Once again the question in each case must be decided 
upon the scale of the operation. Ordinary reviews, and the sale of 
non-performing shares is, according to the authorities which have 
been reviewed herein in order, provided this does not amount to a 
secondary business. In deciding on scale, one cannot merely regard 
the numbers of transactions though they must be a relevant factor. 
The intention behind the sales is of utmost importance. 
In the Middelman case Counsel for the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue relied heavily in argument on the case of Barnato Holdings 
Limited vs S.I.R. (3). It is accordingly necessary to digress at this 
stage to examine this case in some detail. 
Barnafo Holdings Limited was a wholly owned subsidiary of J.C.I. 
Limited and was used as a vehicle for acquiring and holding industrial 
shares in the Group. Its Memorandum was investigated_ in the 
judgement. The first clause empowered it; "to carry on the business 
of an investment holding company, and for the sole purpose of 
investment (i.e. only for the purpose of producing revenue) ... 
(1) to invest the capital and other money of the company in stocks 
and shares ... 
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(2) to vary any investments from time to time and solely for such 
purpose to turn to account or sell any part of the. investment. .. " 
A further paragraph of the Objects clause contained an "independant 
objects" provision according to which each of the objects or powers 
were to be regarded as separate and distinct from and independant of 
each other. The Board of the Company was advised by an investment 
department consisting of a number of experts who provided detailed 
analysis of shares. These experts laid down criteria, not only for the 
purchase of shares, but also which the shares were expected to 
maintain in the Companies hands. Once shares failed to maintain the 
standards set, they were sold and the proceeds used to purchase 
other shares. In a letter to the Receiver of Revenue, written before 
litigation was contemplated the Company stated that it intended to 
invest in shares and that its investments would be subject to periodic 
revision and appropriate re-investment. In a later letter the Company 
informed the Receiver that its holdings were "constantly reviewed". In 
the three years under review by the Court, 82 shares were sold, 
yielding profits of some R3.5million. The value of the portfolio 
increased in that period from RS million to R10 million. 
The totality of these factors, the Appellate Division found, taking into 
account the share dealing that actually took place, amounted to the 
company being engaged in a secondary business of trading. It was an -
integral part of this decision that the objects of the company 
empowered it to trade in shares. The power quoted as (2) above, to 
be read as an independent clause, empowered the company, if it 
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wished, to deal with the shares owned by it at a profit. If the 
principles dealt with in the Korean Syndicate case (9), and those which 
followed it, are applied, then it is clear that Barnato Holdings Limited 
was carrying out an object for which it had been formed, and was 
accordingly, trading. 
In addition, it must be borne in mind that the concept of a secondary 
b u s i n e s s th at d e c i d e d th e B a rn at o H o I d i n g s ca s e , i s i n re a I it y n o m o re 
than a finding by the Court that its capital intention was not a 
dominant intention which absolved its other activities from tax. The 
judgement amounts to a finding that the company had a main 
i n te n t i o n , as we 11 as a s e co n d a r y i n t e n ti o n , b o t h of w h i c h g ave r i s e t o 
taxable profits. 
The individual taxpayer, Middelman was not burdened by an objects 
clause as the company was, nor did he, in the finding of the Court, 
commit himself to a business policy of selling shares. Berman J., in 
the Middelman case, distinguished the cases on two grounds, which he 
said, were fundamental:-
1. Barnato Holdings Limited acknowledged that the switching of 
sh a re i n v e st m e n ts was a I ways co ri t e m p I ate d as p a rt of it s 
business and with this in view availed itself of a panel of experts. 
Middelman had no such contemplation in mind and relied on his 
own expertise. 
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2. It was a business policy of Barnato Holdings Limited to sell 
shares whose market value rose without a corresponding 
increase in dividend yield. There was no suggestion that 
Middelman ever contemplated such a policy. 
Berman J., summed up the differences by saying that it was part of 
the business of Barnato Holdings Limited to dispose of shares for a 
variety of reasons; while Middelman's purpose in selling shares was to 
maintain or increase his dividend income and this was an overriding, 
main and dominant objective. 
In C.I.R. vs Paul (4) Centlivres C J commented on the fact that the 
taxpayer disposed of a capital asset at a profit. Revenue argued that 
as the Respondent had in mind the object of making a profit on the 
asset, the profit was thus taxable. At page 341 the Chief Justice said 
"I think the answer to this contention is simple, it would be contrary to 
human nature for any person to sell an asset at a loss; when 
circumstances are such that he decides to sell, he naturally 
endeavours to get the best price possible". The making of a profit on 
the disposal of a capital asset does not, per se, bring the transaction 
into the tax net. 
In Tods case (5) at page 373 the court found that the dividend policy 
was a main object, but could not, on the facts, hold that it was a 
dominant, overriding object. Accordingly, that object did not solve the 
taxpayers problem, as there was a secondary objective which gave rise 





were different from Middelman in that the taxpayer deliberately 
embarked upon a policy of buying and selling shares in order to 
acquire greater dividends .. 
The court in Middelman did not give any consideration to the principle 
that emerged from the Overseas Trust case (6). Could it be said, in 
the light of the fact that the profits made by the taxpayer were made 
in carrying out a scheme for profit-making, that the profits were 
fortuitous and unforeseen? These are in reality two separate tests. In 
the first instance, in view of the Courts findings that the taxpayer did 
not have a business policy, one would have to accept that a scheme 
for profit making was not present. A review of a portfolio of shares 
from time to time and sales made solely as a result of such review, 
would have to be taken to great lengths in the case of an individual 
taxpayer, before it could be held to be a scheme for profit making. 
The second point presents rather more difficulty. In the Overseas 
Trust case (6) the taxpayer purchased shares well knowing that 
ow n e rs h i p th e r e of w o u I ct e n t it I e h i m to re c e iv e a s u m of m o n e y i n t h e 
future. It was pleaded that the money was a capital enhancement, but 
because of the prior knowledge, it was held that the sum received was 
revenue. On this basis it can be argued that, when dealing over a 
period in a rising market, profits must be foreseen, especially if this is 
coupled with a policy of, at least, avoiding losses. Certainly this 
knowledge was an important factor in both the African Life and Barnato 
cases. 
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If we can accept, as would appear to follow from what has been said, 
that Middelman had an original capital intention which did not change; 
that the scale of his operations did not involve his crossing Holmes 
J.A's Rubicon (7); that he had not embarked upon a scheme for profit 
making; and that he intended to hold his portfolio of shares for keeps, 
then it only remains to decide, on the facts, whether he had a 
dominant intention in holding his shares for dividends. 
In Pauls case (4) the taxpayer sub-divided the surplus land he 
acquired into a number of smallholdings, and sold off 12 of those 
properties over a fiv~ year period. The scale of that operation was 
held by the Appellate Division not to be such as would change the 
dominant intention into what could be described as a main purpose 
only. 
Tods case (5) was divided into a number of phases. In the second 
phase, the taxpayer decided to spread the risk in his portfolio by 
selling some shares, reducing his holding in others, and acquiring still 
others. This process took some two years to complete, and involved 
a number of sales and purchases and realised a substantial profit. 
The Court held that the dominant intention remained the retention of 
the portfolio of shares, for keeps, and that the profits were therefor 
not subject to tax. Later, Tod embarked on a quite different scheme 
of buying and selling shares in order to acquire shares "pregnan! with 
dividends" and discard them once the dividend had been secured. 
This was dealt with on a completely different basis and was held to 
have been a trading operation. 
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Stotts case (8) was very similar to Pauls, except that the scale of 
Stotts operation was greater than that of Paul. Nevertheless, it was 
held that Stott still maintained the dominant intention of holding his 
land as an investment. 
All these decisions, including that in C.I.R. versus Middelman, confirm 
that an individual taxpayer has considerable scope in which to build 
up and manage a portfolio of shares. He will have to establish that 
the shares were originally purchased with a capital intention and that 
this intention has not changed at any time. He will have to prove that 
the portfolio is kept "for keeps" with the object of obtaining dividends. 
The taxpayer will be free to review and manage the portfolio. Provided 
that he can prove that the sales which he does make are made only to 
dispose of shares which do not meet the standard he has set for them, 
and are made to preserve the value of the portfolio and maximize the 
dividend income, then any profits made on such sales will be 
incidental to the dominant intention and not subject to tax. 
Nevertheless, there remains a lirie beyond which the taxpayer may not 
pass. This will bring into operation the other intervening factor of 
which Wessels J A spoke in the Stott case (8). The taxpayer will have 
crossed the Rubicon, as Homes J A put it in the Natal Estates case 
(7). Just where that line is to be drawn is impossible to define. Each 
case will be decided on its own merits. 
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THE MARGO COMMISSION AND SECTION 9B 
It is clear from what has been said that there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in our Law in distinguishing, in particular cases, between 
matters which are of a capital nature, and those which constitute 
income. It was argued before the Margo Commission that this 
uncertainty had economic consequences for the country in that it 
prejudiced taxpayers ability to plan their affairs, and it resulted in 
considerable sums of money being locked in to unproductive capital 
assets. The argument ran that if there was certainty as to the 
difference then taxpayers could manage their affairs accordingly. 
The Commission considered many of the arguments and the judgmen _ 
that have been referred to in this paper, and came to the fir~, 
conclusion that the subjective criteria that have evolved in the Court~/.:/·'.'.:·• 
-·. ~·\;'-' < 
in separating capital gains from income are unsatisfactory (Marg.o_ 
Report, page 2 2 1 , par a g rap h 1 2 . 2 4) . The Co m miss i on f o u n d as a f ~~.({\(·· 
',:c' .• < 
th at funds required for the d eve Io pm e nt of the economy are bei._",-~.\;L .. 
immobilised because taxpay~rs are uncertain whether they will hav~j~}:: 
-'-' .. \:·>> S.-=~ 
, pay tax on gains which they may realise in the process of dis-investi~9 .. > 
from existing investments. 
56 
In the course of its consideration of the problem the Commission also 
considered the advisability of a capital gains tax. For reasons which 
are outside the scope of this inquiry it recommended that no such tax 
be introduced, but made the point that, even if it were, this would not, 
' 
in itself, solve the problem of distinguishing between capital and 
revenue. In countries which do tax capital gains, the problem 
remains. That it is not such a visible issue is largely due to the fact 
that the authorities, knowing that they will collect a tax of some 
nature, whichever way the decision goes, are more lenient in arriving 
at such decisions. The problems remain the same. 
One suggestion made to the Commission was that all gains made on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange be classified as capital gains. This 
was rejected as being far too narrow an approach, and for introducing 
an element of discrimination. 
The Commissions solution was to substitute objective criteria as the· 
test in differentiating between capital and revenue, for the subjective 
tests that have been referred to. Exactly what such criteria should be 
was not de c i d e d , but a nu m be r of suggestions were made . Among the ·< 
tests suggested were: the length of time the asset had been held; the. 
turnover during the year in which the asset was sold, of similar assets 
ow n e d b. y th e tax p aye r ; t h e f r e q u e n c y of t r a n s act i o n s ; th e tr ad~ 
carried on by the taxpayer; and the way in which the proceeds are· 
dealt with in the taxpayers financial statements. The Commission 
recommended that further research into additional criteria was 
necessary. 
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The Commission recognised that the imposition of a rigid test in this 
manner would, in certain cases, lead to inequities. However, it felt 
that the certainty that such a. test would bring would far outweigh this 
factor, and that taxpayers would have the opportunity to regulate their 
affairs in such a way as to avoid most of the injustices that were 
theoretically possible. 
This recommendation by Margo has not, at least not yet, been 
accepted, apart from the introduction of a new Section 9B to the 
Income Tax Act. This will be referred to again herein. It is submitted 
that acceptance of the recommendations would raise as many 
economic problems as would be solved. One of the major effects, 
though, of such a test would be to remove the consideration of the 
question away from the Courts and into the economic sphere. 
There was a minority recommendation by two of the Commissioners 
to the effect that the present system be maintained and that the 
Commissioners staff be increased in order to deal with applications 
for rulings in advance of affected transactions. No details were given 
of the reasoning of the minority but it is submitted that this aspect 
could be expanded into a workable solution. 
Section 3(3) of the Income Tax Act provides that decisions made and 
notices signed by officers acting under the control or direction of the 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue may be withdrawn either by the 
Commissioner, or by the officer concerned, but are effective until so 
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withdrawn. However, such a decision or notice made in the exercise 
of a discretionary power made under the present or any past Income 
Tax Act may not be withdrawn after two years have passed from the 
date of the decision or notice. This applies only to decisions and 
notices given in writing. Verbal communications are not binding upon 
the Commissioner. It is also provided that if all relevant facts were 
not known to the officer concerned at the time the decision was made 
then it is not binding. 
Section 3(3) of the Act provides that if such decision or notice is 
issued in writing by the Commissioner personally, then he cannot 
withdraw the decision or notice, provided all relevant facts were known 
to him. 
It has become practise for taxpayers to approach the Revenue in 
certain instances to ask for a ruling in advance, as to whether a 
particular transaction which is being contemplated will attract tax or 
n o t. A p r o p o s e d d i s p o s a I of a s s et s co n s i d e re d by t h e tax p a y e r t o b e-
c a pit a I in his hands, lends itself to such a request for a ruling. 
Neither the Commissioner nor any of his officers is obliged to give 
such a ruling in terms of the Income Tax Act as it is presently enacted, 
but if a ruling is given, then Sections 3(2) and 3 (3) will apply to it. 
It is suggested that the Income Tax Act be amended to provide that, 
in the event of a taxpayer wishing to dispose of an asset which he 
considers is a capital asset, that taxpayer be entitled, as of right, to 
obtain a ruling from the Commissioner as to whether the disposal of 
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the asset in the manner suggested by the taxpayer will attract tax. 
Such ruling, whether issued by the Commissioner or by an official 
should be made to be binding on the Commissioner and should be 
issued within a reasonable time of a request being made by the 
taxpayer. 
The legislation should impose an onus on the taxpayer to make a full 
disclosure of all relevant information, and could provide that the 
Commissioner have the right to examine the taxpayer under oath on 
the subject, in the discretion of the Commissioner. In the event of it 
being shown at a later stage that a full disclosure was not made, then 
the Commissioner should have the right to set the decision aside. It 
should also be a provision that a taxpayer dissatisfied with such ruling 
be entitled to take the matter on appeal to the Special Court for 
Hearing Income Tax Appeals in the same manner as presently exists in. 
regard to an appeal against an assessment. 
A procedure of this nature would, it is submitted, satisfy the 
objections to the present system based on uncertainty. The taxpayer 
would not have to place his patrimony at risk in order to discover 
whether he was liable to tax. The principles which emerge from the 
I 
cases quoted earlier, which are well grounded in our Law, would not 
be disturbed, but would rather be re-enforced. 
The Legislatures one concession to the Margo Commission lies in the 
introduction of Section 98 into the Income Tax Act. This provides, 
that. in respect of shares listed on a licensed stock exchange, and 
. .. )2!!'25:Jl£N3.J!J/• o.a rii-f! W '"TfflP!Tr£!!'!".EW' ~ -
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which were owned by a taxpayer for a period of ten years, the taxpayer 
has an election. In the tax year in which such a share is disposed of, 
the taxpayer may elect to declare the proceeds of such disposal as 
capital. If he makes this election, then, from that date onwards the 
proceeds of the sale of all shares which he has held for ten years will 
be regarded as capital. 
The obvious disadvantages are that the section only refers to listed 
shares that have been owned for a minimum period of ten years, and 
that the taxpayer, having made the election, is bound thereby, ad 
infinitum. No losses that he may incur on those shares can be off-set 
against gains or other revenue. From the nature of share 
investments many shares will be sold for a variety of reasons 
within the ten year period, and the Section will thus not apply to 
them. 
It appears that this legislation has been introduced to meet a very 
specific requirement. Evidence led before the Margo Commission 
was to the effect that certain investment companies have large 
shareholdings owned for periods in excess of ten years, but which 
cannot be disposed of without attracting tax due to other activities 
by such Companies. This provision will allow them to dispose of 
these shares. 
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However, it would not have assisted any of the taxpayers referred 
to in the reported decisions referred to above, and must have 
limited application. 
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